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Abstract
We examine the resource provision role of the board of directors in ensuring substantive corporate sustainability practices. 
Specifically, we examine two channels of resource provision (i.e., the presence of non-executive directors with previous 
experience in environmental issues—EEDs—and network connections of EEDs) that can affect a firm’s ethical and envi-
ronmental behavior. Using greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions data from FTSE 350 firms, as a measure of environmental 
performance, we show that the presence of EEDs on the board is associated with lower GHG emissions. Further, firms with 
better-networked EEDs have better environmental performance. A possible mechanism is that firms with EEDs invest more 
in environmental technology. These results suggest that, in addition to the traditional role of shareholder value maximization, 
the board of directors also caters to the interests of wider stakeholders of the firm by facilitating substantive ethical practices.
Keywords Director expertise · Director networks · Emissions · Environmental performance
JEL Classification G34 · G39 · L14 · L25 · Q50
Introduction
Environmental impact of production and business activities 
is one of the most pressing questions of our times. Firms are 
under increasing institutional pressure to be environmentally 
responsible, and this pressure manifests in different ways. 
Most countries have now issued codes of ethical practices 
on environmental sustainability (e.g., in the USA, the Ceres 
Principles are a ten-point code of corporate environmental 
conduct, publicly and voluntarily endorsed by companies). 
At a more global level, international certification standards 
for environmental management have been developed: the 
ISO 14001 introduced in 1996 by the International Organi-
zation for Standardization or the Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme (EMAS) launched by the European Commis-
sion in 1993. Corporate environmental disclosures are also 
receiving increased scrutiny by national authorities.1 For 
example, in the UK, under the Companies Act 2006, listed 
companies are required to report greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions since October 2013. All these initiatives aim at 
improving firms’ ethical behavior in terms of environmental 
sustainability and their success is likely to depend on how 
the corporate sector responds to them. Yet, there is little evi-
dence on how firms internalize these institutional pressures 
or how corporate governance impacts upon the environmen-
tal performance of firms.
In this paper, we focus on some factors that may help 
firms adopt substantive actions toward environmental sus-
tainability. In particular, we examine the role of specific 
skills and networks of directors in shaping the environmen-
tal performance of firms through information agglomera-
tion. Because of the increasing importance and the strategic 
nature of environmental issues, the board of directors is 
likely to influence a firm’s environmental policy. Moreover, 
due to the long-term and complex nature of environmental 
problems, the resource provision role of the directors will be 
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crucial. We focus on two channels through which directors 
can agglomerate information and provide relevant advice to 
the management to improve a firm’s environmental perfor-
mance. First, a director with specific environmental expe-
rience (henceforth EED) can narrow the information gap 
between the board and the management (Pfeffer and Salan-
cik 1978). Second, well-connected EEDs can facilitate the 
exchange of information on environmental strategies across 
the boundaries of the firm.
These are important questions in the business ethics and 
corporate finance literature for two reasons. First, they shed 
light on how governance practices can affect environmental 
performance and corporate ethical behaviour more broadly. 
Second, they provide evidence on how director expertise 
matters in sustainable strategic decision making. More spe-
cifically, our results highlight the board characteristics poli-
cymakers and shareholders have to target to enhance firms’ 
environmental performance. For example, regulations such 
as the Companies Act 2006 in the UK make the directors 
responsible for the environmental impact of the firm. Such 
individual accountability must be in sync with the influence 
directors have on environmental performance.
To this end, we use GHG emission data from the Euro-
pean Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR), as 
a measure of a firm’s environmental performance, and infor-
mation on the board composition and director networks of 
FTSE 350 firms from BoardEx. Our sample comprises an 
unbalanced panel of 274 firms for the period 2006–2014. 
We measure environmental expertise with the presence of 
at least one EED and board-level committees on sustain-
able issues. To address the second question, we focus on the 
EEDs network formed by shared directorships: two directors 
are connected if they sit on the same board in a given year. 
We evaluate how well-networked an individual EED is (and 
so the ease of accessing information across the boundaries 
of the firm), by computing four measures of connectedness. 
These measures capture different aspects of the quality of 
an EED’s connections that are relevant for the transmission 
of information within the EED network.
In estimating the effect on the environmental per-
formance of board expertise and director networks, it 
is important to control for potential bias introduced by 
endogenous appointment of EEDs or better-networked 
directors in certain firms. In addition to adjusting for firm 
and year fixed effects to mitigate time-invariant omitted 
variable bias, we control for a range of firm and indus-
try characteristics. When investigating whether the pres-
ence of EEDs and board-level committees on sustain-
able issues affect environmental performance, we also 
use two-stage least square estimations to control for bias 
induced by time-varying unobservables. In particular, 
we focus on the potential bias introduced by assorta-
tive sorting between EEDs and firms. This sorting can 
be either positive if EEDs only accept jobs in firms with 
low GHG emissions (for reputation issues for example) or 
negative if the demand for EEDs is higher in firms with 
high GHG emissions. We instrument the appointment of 
EEDs with a measure of the supply of potential directors 
with environmental expertise. A higher supply of direc-
tors with environmental expertise is likely to lower the 
cost of appointing such directors on boards, but should 
not directly influence an individual firm’s environmental 
performance. We find an economically meaningful effect 
of having EEDs on the board, particularly if these direc-
tors are members of board-level committees focused on 
environmental issues. These results are robust to different 
classifications of EEDs and board committees for envi-
ronmental issues.
Regarding our second question, we find that better-net-
worked EEDs are associated with lower GHG emissions. How-
ever, it is possible that this result is driven by the endogenous 
selection of more skilled directors (who tend to have larger 
networks) to firms with better environmental performance. 
Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that endogenous matching 
on director skills can drive the results of board connections 
and financial performance of firms. We perform an array of 
tests to examine possible endogeneity in board composition 
and director networks. The results of these tests also support 
the view that the negative association of board networks and 
GHG emissions are driven by better access to information.
Finally, when investigating the impact of EEDs on other cor-
porate outcomes, we find higher levels of capital expenditures, 
and research and development expenses in firms with EEDs and 
better-networked EEDs compared to firms without. This sug-
gests that a possible mechanism through which EEDs can affect 
GHG emissions is through investments in green technologies.
Our findings add to several strands of business ethics, and 
corporate finance literature. First, we contribute to the litera-
ture in business ethics analyzing how governance structure 
can effectively influence corporate ethical and environmental 
behavior. The fundamental questions in the business ethics 
literature are why and how do firms ensure environmental 
sustainability? (Walker and Wan 2012). In answering the 
‘why’ question, the role of the board of directors to protect 
the interests of the shareholders is much studied (Bebchuk 
and Weisbach 2010; Cohen et al. 2004). In this paper, we 
focus on the ‘how’ question. While exploring how govern-
ance mechanisms can affect a firm’s environmental sustaina-
bility, we also shed light on the debate between green-wash-
ing and active corporate environmental management (Laufer 
2003; Walker and Wan 2012). It is of interest to understand 
how firms can set up formal governance mechanisms to 
ensure ethical behavior, and whether such actions are sym-
bolic or substantive. We examine how firms can internalize 
pressures to be sustainable and respond to these pressures 
with substantive ethical practices. Our results suggest that 
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proactive environmental management practices include the 
appointment of directors with relevant skills and network 
connections and that these practices directly influence firms’ 
ethical behaviour in terms of environmental sustainability.
In that respect, our paper is related to the literature on 
firms’ voluntary measures related to environmental sustain-
ability. The prior literature has examined the motivations 
of firms to participate in voluntary environmental manage-
ment and climate change programmes, and the implications 
for environmental performance (Anton et al. 2004; Fisher-
Vanden and Thorburn 2011). These papers have highlighted 
the impact of firm size, profitability, access to financing, 
regulatory and stakeholder pressures on the uptake of vol-
untary environmental practices by firms. Elsayed (2006) also 
shows that firm size and available resources are significant 
predictors of corporate environmental performance. A key 
distinction of our paper is that we focus on specific envi-
ronmental expertise rather than a more general directorial 
expertise and on the quality of board connections rather than 
only the number of these connections.
The existing literature analyzes the impact of various 
board characteristics on corporate social or environmental 
performance (Rao and Tilt 2016; Walls et al. 2012). Some 
studies also investigate the relationship between a measure of 
environmental performance and the two board characteristics 
we are focusing on, namely expertise and connections. Ortiz-
de-Mandojana et al. (2012) show that multiple directorships 
(i.e., the number of boards a director is connected to) have a 
positive impact on the adoption of proactive environmental 
strategies by the firm. Two other papers (Kassinis and Vafeas 
2002) examine the relationship between board characteristics 
and the number of violations of environmental legislation. 
While Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) find weak evidence that 
prosecuted firms have directors with fewer multiple director-
ships, McKendall et al. (1999) find that the presence of attor-
neys on the board is not significantly related to the number 
of environmental violations. de Villiers et al. (2011) is the 
paper the most closely related to ours as they also investigate 
the advisory and monitoring roles of the board of directors in 
shaping a firm’s environmental performance. They show that 
firms with a larger representation of CEOs from other boards 
and more legal experts have better environmental perfor-
mance. They don’t find any effect of multiple directorships.
Furthermore, we add to this business ethics literature 
by using a quantitative and comparable measure of ethical 
behavior, i.e., the level of greenhouse gas emissions. The 
majority of studies use an aggregated score-based measure 
(KLD) as a proxy for environmental performance (Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky 2014). While this provides a measure to 
rank firms, it subsumes the underlying distribution of emis-
sions. Some other studies use negative environmental events 
like oil spills, government enforcement actions, lawsuits, etc. 
(Klassens and McLaughlin 1996; Konar and Cohen 2001). 
These measures, while useful in studying a particular type 
of pollution or an event, doesn’t provide an objective and 
comparable measure of firms’ environmental performance.
Second, our paper is related to the literature on the advi-
sory role of the board and directors’ expertise. While the 
monitoring role of the board of directors has been exten-
sively researched, recent work highlights the importance of 
the advisory role, specifically when directors have relevant 
expertise and when the regulatory environment is complex 
(Dass et al. 2014; Coles et al. 2008). The financial, legal, 
industry, and political expertise of directors have been well 
studied (Güner et al. 2008; Goldman et al. 2009; Dass et al. 
2014). These papers provide evidence on the financial ben-
efits to a firm from related expertise of directors. A key dis-
tinction of our paper is that we examine the effect of direc-
tor expertise on environmental strategy, which is likely to 
involve large capital expenditures with uncertain returns, are 
institutionally complex, and can have long-term value impli-
cations (Konar and Cohen 2001). Moreover, the impact of 
director expertise on GHG emissions is more than a specific 
case of the above-mentioned results because environmental 
and financial performance presents a short-term trade-off to 
the firm. Director expertise may not affect in similar ways 
sustainability issues as it does for firm value.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on connected 
boards. Existing literature studies the effect of director/CEO 
connections on the financial performance of firms (Hwang 
and Kim 2009). There is evidence on the impact of the social 
network of directors on venture capital (Hochberg et al. 
2007), managerial compensation (Hwang and Kim 2009), 
and lending markets (Garmaise and Moskowitz 2003). More 
closely aligned to this paper is the burgeoning literature on 
innovation economics and corporate governance that looks 
at how firm investment into innovation is affected by CEO 
types or characteristics (e.g., Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006; 
Acemoglu et al. 2014). For example, Gomes-Casseres et al. 
(2006) show that innovations and patent filings are associ-
ated with board network connections. Our paper adds to this 
literature by examining how knowledge-flow through direc-
tor networks affects GHG emissions.
Theory and Hypotheses
Resource Dependence Perspective to Substantive 
Ethical Practices
Environmental sustainability has become a salient business 
issue in the recent times. Faced with pressures to engage 
in sustainable practices, firms either react symbolically 
(Westphal and Zajac 1998) or take substantive actions to 
reduce their environmental impact (Fisher-Vanden and Thor-
burn 2011). Either way, the aim is to communicate to the 
272 S. Homroy, A. Slechten 
1 3
stakeholders about the ethical stance and gain legitimacy 
on ethical practices. Obtaining such legitimacy is useful to 
firms as they benefit from better access to resources, and 
better performance (Klassens and McLaughlin 1996; Konar 
and Cohen 2001). Rationally, we can expect firms to reduce 
the cost of compliance and engage in symbolic ethical prac-
tices. However, Walker and Wan (2012) argue that symbolic 
environmental practices negatively affect firms, and finan-
cial benefits can only be derived from substantive ethical 
practices.
Given the link between environmental and financial 
performance, it is important to understand how firms can 
ensure substantive ethical practices. While previous studies 
have focused on firms’ communication about green tech-
nology, we focus on more costly and hence arguably more 
impactful and substantive actions (Stevens et al. 2005). With 
increasing importance of environmental sustainability, these 
issues should fall under the purview of the board of direc-
tors, which forms the “apex” of decision making and corpo-
rate control, primarily tasked with monitoring and advising 
senior management (Fama and Jensen 1983; Adams et al. 
2010). While the monitoring role of the board of directors 
has been extensively researched, this study investigates the 
advisory role of the board. This role is based on the resource 
dependence theory, which suggests that directors facilitate 
access to resources and narrow the information gap between 
the board and the management (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Resource and information provision is particularly important 
in this context as environmental issues may involve large 
capital expenditures with uncertain and long-term returns 
and are institutionally complex. Firms will seek advice from 
the board of directors to form their environmental strategy 
and can benefit from access to relevant information about 
environmental impacts, good environmental practices, new 
environmentally efficient technologies (and their implemen-
tation costs), etc.
In their seminal work, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) iden-
tify the possible channels through which directors can 
enhance the access of firms to resources. These include pro-
viding counsel, opening up access to information beyond the 
boundaries of the firm, and ensuring a better connectedness 
to the broad information network. We use this framework 
to identify two possible channels through which boards can 
agglomerate useful information and advise the management. 
First, the quality of counsel will depend on the expertise of 
their own directors in environmental matters. Therefore, we 
identify director expertise in environmental sustainability as 
a potential channel of resource provision. Second, directors 
can serve as conduits of information agglomeration across 
different firms. In that sense, the connectivity of the direc-
tors, specifically the directors with environmental expertise, 
is likely to be another channel to provide resources relevant 
to the firm’s environmental strategy.
Environmental Expert Directors (EEDs) and GHG 
Emissions
Recent works on the functions on corporate boards high-
light the importance of the advisory role, specifically when 
directors have relevant expertise and when the regulatory 
environment is complex (Dass et al. 2014; Coles et al. 2008). 
These papers provide evidence on the importance of legal, 
political, and industry experience of non-executive directors. 
For example, Dass et al. (2014) show that firms benefit from 
appointing directors with specific experience of working in 
related industries. Another area where firms can benefit from 
the specific expertise of the directors is environmental sus-
tainability. This is due to various aspects of environmental 
issues: the complexity and the number of environmental 
regulations, the extent of capital expenditures that imple-
menting environmental practices may involve, their long-
term impacts, etc.
Firms engaging in substantive ethical practices may seek 
to appoint a director with environmental resources (i.e., 
EED). EEDs with specific human capital are in a better 
position to offer counsel on environmental issues and pro-
vide better resource access to firms. They are more likely to 
bring to light the elements of environmental management 
that are the most critical and the most suitable for the firm 
than a director without this expertise. However, firms may 
incur search cost to appoint EEDs, and appointing EEDs 
may keep out directors with other specific skills which are 
valuable to the firm. This is why we expect the presence of 
an EED to be indicative of substantive ethical practices and 
to be positively associated with environmental performance.
H1 Director expertise in environmental sustainability is 
associated with lower GHG emissions.
We also explore a possible channel through which EEDs 
can impact upon GHG emissions. Recent results show that 
boards are increasingly functioning through committees 
(Adams 2003; Billmoria and Piderit 1994; Laux and Laux 
2009). These committees are focused on specific tasks like 
audits of financial accounts, the nomination of new direc-
tors, managing environmental risks, etc. They are shown 
to be effective governance mechanisms (Guo and Masulis 
2015). If the allocation of resources in the board is opti-
mal, we will expect EEDs to sit at board-level committees 
focused on environmental risks and performance. However, 
matching of director expertise to committee roles is a recent 
phenomenon. For example, till 2012 JPMorgan Chase had 
no directors with risk expertise on the risk committee. We 
hypothesize that firms, where EEDs are assigned to envi-
ronmental committees, are likely to benefit in terms of envi-
ronmental performance, compared to firms where EEDs are 
not assigned to environmental committees. Together with 
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Hypothesis 1, we explore how specific expertise of direc-
tors in environmental sustainability affects GHG emissions, 
through environmental board committees.
H2 The assignment of directors with environmental exper-
tise to board committees focused on environmental issues is 
associated with further reductions in GHG emissions.
EED Networks and GHG Emissions
The second way through which EEDs can ease the access 
to resources and information is by leveraging their social 
capital across organizational boundaries. Firms differ in the 
use of environmental technologies; hence, better-networked 
EEDs (i.e., EEDs with a better connectedness with other 
EEDs) are likely to have better access to resources and infor-
mation regarding good environmental practices used in other 
companies. By sharing directorship in different companies, 
EEDs are exposed to various environmental strategies or 
investment opportunities and can exchange information 
related to environmental issues. They may, therefore, have a 
comparative advantage in their advisory role (Larcker et al. 
2013). In a similar context, Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) show 
that directors accumulate human capital from their multi-
ple board affiliations and can lead to fewer environmental 
litigations.
At the same time, it is possible for value-destroying prac-
tices to be propagated through director networks: EEDs sit-
ting on the boards of many different firms spend less time 
to advise an individual firm or engage in collusive practices 
on environmental sustainability issues (Fich and Shivdasani 
2006). These practices may negatively impact upon envi-
ronmental performance. If the first effect dominates (i.e., 
better access to information), then the expertise and network 
channels will reinforce each other and the benefits accrue to 
firms, which appoint better-connected EEDs. On the other 
hand, if the collusive practices dominate, we expect the 
network effect to offset partially the expertise effect. The 
resource dependence argument is that the net effect of direc-
tor connectedness on the firm should be positive, notwith-
standing the possibility of reduced monitoring (de Villiers 
et al. 2011). Based on that, we test the hypothesis that infor-
mation spillovers through EED networks positively influence 
environmental performance.
H3 EED networks facilitate their resource provision role 
and are associated with lower GHG emissions.
Data and Variables
In this section, we discuss the data sources, variables con-
struction and sample selection for our empirical tests.
Sample Selection
Our sample is taken from listed UK firms featured in the 
FTSE 350 index over the period 2006–2014. From Data-
stream, we collect information on performance, size, risk in 
the operating environment and industry classifications. We 
augment this with information on individual directors, board 
composition and board networks of these firms using Boar-
dEx. Finally, firm-level environmental emissions data are 
obtained from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register (E-PRTR).
To be included in our sample, firms have to feature in the 
FTSE 350 for at least two consecutive years, have the full 
set of board characteristics, and have relevant financial data 
available. With these constraints, we have an unbalanced 
panel of 375 firms. Once included, we continue to follow a 
firm unless it is acquired or taken private.
From this sample, we drop firms for which no director 
has any network connections. We augment the FTSE 350 
sample with network centrality measures (defined below) of 
individual EEDs using information available from BoardEx. 
To calculate the network centrality measures, we use shared 
directorships from all quoted boards in Europe. As an addi-
tional sample selection criterion, we require that firms have 
pollution data (from E-PRTR) for all years. This restricts 
our sample to an unbalanced panel with 4143 firm-year and 
18,098 director-year observations.
Finally, not all industries pollute through GHG emissions. 
We restrict our sample to firms from GHG emitting indus-
tries only and exclude firms in Financial and IT industries. 
Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 3244 
firm-year and 16,212 director-year observations. Table 1 and 
“Appendix 1” summarize the key variables of the sample.
Measuring Environmental Performance
As a measure of firms’ environmental performance, we use 
firms’ GHG emission data from the E-PRTR. The E-PRTR 
provides annual pollution data from more than 30,000 facil-
ities in Europe over the period 2007–2014 across several 
industrial sectors. It provides data on releases of pollutants 
to air, water and land as well as off-site transfers of waste and 
of pollutants in wastewater from 93 key pollutants, including 
heavy metals, pesticide, greenhouse gases and dioxins. The 
main advantage of the register is that data are comparable 
across countries and pollutants because data collection and 
reporting are standardized overall pollutants in all countries 
(see “Appendix 2” for details).
Pollution data in the E-PRTR is at the facility-level—
where a facility is an operation unit of a firm focused on a 
narrowly defined process like packaging, bottling, etc. To 
arrive at the firm-level emission data, we aggregate GHG 
emissions for all European facilities of an FTSE 350 firm. 
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This aggregation process requires multilevel matching. 
E-PRTR reports the parent firm of each facility. We first 
aggregate the information of all facilities that have the same 
parent firm. 281 of these parent companies reported by the 
E-PRTR are not publicly listed firms themselves, but are 
wholly owned subsidiaries of listed firms. We map these 
subsidiaries to the listed firms by using information available 
from Osiris. This matching exercise yields 89 unmatched 
firms. We manually supplement the missing information on 
parent firms from the publicly available news and drop from 
the sample firms where no information is available. This 
leads to omission of 40 firms. Our measure of GHG emis-
sions is standardized by the threshold level of pollutant. The 
reporting thresholds are set up by the European Commission 
based on their impact on human health and on the environ-
ment. For example, the reporting threshold for  CO2 is 100 
million kgs/year.
We validate our matching algorithm by comparing our 
agglomerated GHG emission data with the GHG emission 
data available from Datastream. We use the ENERDP123 
field in Datastream that reports the annual total GHG 
emissions as  CO2 equivalents. By using our agglomeration 
algorithm, we have improved upon the coverage of Data-
stream by 32.37%: on average Datastream reports GHG 
emissions for 207 firms across the sample period whereas 
we could calculate GHG emissions of 274 firms. The corre-
lation of the GHG measure reported by Datastream and our 
measure is 0.809. Given the wider coverage of our measure, 
we use our GHG emission data in the baseline regressions 
and test for the robustness of our results using the subsample 
of firms with GHG emission data from Datastream.
We also check for the robustness of our results using two 
other measures of environmental pollution (aggregated at 
the firm level using the same type of algorithm): emissions 
of other gases like sulfur and nitrogen oxides, ammonia, 




We identify three different sources of director expertise in 
environmental issues. First, we use information provided 
by BoardEx on individual directors’ background to control 
for specific experience in environmental sustainability. Fol-
lowing the sample selection protocol used by Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia (2009), we classify a director as EED if the 
job description of a previous role contains keywords like 
“environment”, “ecology”, “pollution”, “sustainable”, etc.2 
Information on committee formations allows us to identify 
directors with experience on board sub-committees that 
have an environment/pollution control focus. Finally, we 
use information on awards for and recognition of individual 
directors on environmental issues.3 It is important to note 
that we only take into account previous experience in envi-
ronmental roles to classify EEDs. For example, if a director 
is appointed on an environmental committee in firm F1 in 
period t, we do not classify her as an EED in firm F1 in sub-
sequent time periods t + 1, t + 2, ... However, we will classify 
her as an EED in another firm F2 if she is appointed in this 
firm F2 in the periods t + 1, t + 2, ...
It is possible that we do not have complete information 
on environmental sustainability-related roles, and environ-
ment-related awards of directors, and this can be a likely 
source of attenuation bias. In that regard, our results will 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of key variables
All monetary values are expressed in constant 2010 US$
N Mean Median SD
GHG emissions (normalized) 3244 12.085 6.762 26.110
EED dummy 3244 0.094 0.000 0.144
Number of EEDs 3244 1.470 1.089 1.986
Environmental Committee 3244 0.47 0.40 0.084
Degree 3244 4.107 3.085 2.239
Closeness 3244 0.294 0.217 0.016
Betweenness 3244 0.020 0.035 0.018
Eigen vector 3244 0.054 0.073 0.040
ROA 3244 7.802 6.126 6.546
MTBV 3244 1.501 0.334 2.620
Ln sales 3244 17.422 11.215 6.874
Leverage 3244 0.556 0.511 0.0282
Volatility 3244 0.039 0.044 0.021
Slack 3244 0.225 0.137 0.259
Firm Age 3244 3.012 2.828 1.605
R&D 3244 0.049 0.003 0.033
Capital expenditure 3244 0.594 0.022 0.584
CEO pay (’00,000 US$) 3244 13.282 8.705 5.357
CEO turnover 3244 0.194 0.122 0.067
HHI 3244 0.211 0.203 0.194
CEO duality 3244 0.230 0.000 0.301
%Shareholding-Institutions 3244 28.242 22.108 20.491
Board Size 3244 8.143 7.988 2.660
% Non-executive directors 3244 55.309 51.342 24.143
Average board tenure 3244 6.273 4.114 2.527
No. of law expert 3244 1.185 1.000 0.876
2 All variants of these words are used to encode environmental expe-
rience. A complete list of these keywords is presented in “Appendix 
3”.
3 Such awards include environmental leadership awards, global cross 
millennium awards for corporate environmental leadership, etc.
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be conservative estimates of the impact of these variables 
on environmental performance.
For encoding the environmental experience of direc-
tors, we use the subsample of non-executive independent 
directors: individuals who are less aligned with manage-
ment have a lower incentive to maximize short-term profits 
and are more likely to influence the environmental per-
formance (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Johnson and Green-
ing 1999). Our measure of director expertise is a binary 
indicator of environmental expertise, which is equal to 
one if any of the three measures discussed above are rel-
evant to that director in a given year. To give an example, 
independent non-executive director Patrick Grasby of Drax 
Group PLC, an electrical power generation company, has 
previous experience of being on the environmental sus-
tainability committee in OPG Power Ventures group. He is 
therefore encoded in our sample as an EED. On average, a 
firm has 1.4 EEDs. We then aggregate this indicator at the 
board level in three different ways. First, we use a binary 
indicator (EED dummy), which is equal to one if at least 
one director on the board is an EED. Second, to attenuate 
the concern that a binary measure of EED might partially 
capture the effect of independent directors, we examine 
in two alternate specifications the effect of directors with 
environmental knowledge using Number of EEDs on the 
board and Average Tenure of EEDs on the board.
It may be the case that the presence of EEDs on the 
board reflects a firm’s intrinsic focus on environmental 
issues. To isolate the effect of environmental expertise, 
we also define an indicator for the presence of an environ-
mental committee on the board. This measure captures the 
importance of environmental performance to a firm: a firm 
with a board committee on environmental issues is likely 
to attach more importance to environmental performance 
than firms that do not have such committees. 54% of sam-
ple firms has an environmental committee or a board com-
mittee that is concerned with environmental sustainability 
in 2014. This proportion was 41% at the beginning of the 
sample period. To test our second hypothesis, that EEDs 
assigned to board committees focused on environmental 
issues should help the firm further reduce its emissions, 
we also consider an interaction term.
An econometric concern of using the environmental expe-
rience of directors is the potential bias induced by assorta-
tive sorting. Two situations are plausible. First, the demand 
for EEDs can be higher in firms (or industries) with higher 
GHG emissions. Director appointment with environmental 
expertise is likely to be more prevalent in high-pollution 
industries. Even though this could induce biased estimates, 
such negative assortative sorting will only reinforce the 
importance of environmental experience of directors. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, it may be possible that the supply 
of EEDs is constrained for high-polluting industries, i.e., 
out of reputation concerns, EEDs do not accept offers from 
polluting firms. If so, the effect of EEDs on GHG emissions 
will be an artifact of this positive sorting mechanism. We 
aim to address this concern in several ways.
In Table 2, we present the industry breakdown of GHG 
emissions and aggregate supply of EEDs. There is little 
evidence of supply constraint of such directors in high-
polluting industries like energy and industrial production: 
about 37.25% of all EEDs are in the energy and industrial 
production sectors, which represent 38.32% of the firms in 
our sample. The distribution of EEDs partially mitigates 
concerns about assortative sorting. Nevertheless, we use a 
2SLS approach, where we instrument the appointment of 
environmental directors on a board by the aggregate sup-
ply of such directors in the same industry of the firm. This 
aggregate supply of EEDs in each industry is computed by 
summing all directors with some environmental experience 
and sitting on the board of firms in that industry in each year. 
We explain the theoretical underpinning of our exclusion 
restrictions in the Empirical Analysis Section.
EED Networks
As previously discussed, we use information from Boar-
dEx to build the EED networks that shared directorship 
gives rise to. For each year, each individual EED is a node, 
and two such directors (or nodes) i and j are connected if 
they sit on at least one board k in time t. Mathematically, 
a network is a square “adjacency” matrix where each cell 
indicates whether two individual directors are connected. 
As we use undirected networks whereby the connection 
Table 2  Industry composition 
of the sample
a Fast-moving consumer goods
Industry No. of firms EED (No.) GHG Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector
Energy 23 131 16.230 5.012 0.338 0.025 0.057
Industrial 82 78 15.429 4.878 0.267 0.024 0.052
FMCGa 77 82 10.188 3.603 0.256 0.018 0.046
Pharmaceuticals 31 110 11.536 5.212 0.314 0.027 0.057
Healthcare 38 72 9.006 3.395 0.270 0.020 0.049
Utilities 23 88 13.319 3.404 0.281 0.019 0.047
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between two directors has no directional character (i.e., 
there is no assumption on the direction of the flow of infor-
mation between two directors), the adjacency matrix is 
symmetric. Note that for our baseline analysis we focus 
on the network of non-executive EEDs only.
Our objective is to analyze how the relative importance 
or centrality of EEDs in the network affects a firm’s envi-
ronmental performance. The concept of connections qual-
ity or centrality is multidimensional. We focus on four 
basic dimensions widely used in the network literature (see 
Jackson 2010). The degree or the number of unique con-
nections to other EEDs gives us the number of channels 
of information available. Second, closeness measures how 
easily an EED can reach all the other EEDs in the network. 
A high level of closeness indicates better interactions 
among EEDs without going through many intermediar-
ies. Third, any director is more central in a network if she/
he is connected to more directors. This measure, between-
ness, emphasizes the role of an EED as an intermediary in 
a given network. Finally, an EED is well-networked if she 
is connected to other EEDs who are also well-networked. 
Eigenvector measures EED’s centrality based on the cen-
trality of her first-degree connections. Formal definitions 
of these centrality measures can be found in “Appendix 4”.
To obtain a measure of centrality at the board-level, we 
compute the average centrality measures for all the EEDs 
on the board in a given year. In Table 3, we provide the 
time series of our centrality measures at the board level. 
On average, an individual firm is linked to 4 other firms 
(Degree) and this remains stable over time. The average 
closeness and betweenness measures of our sample are 
also stable over time. Given that the time series of the 
aggregate network are stable, our concern that the empiri-
cal results could be an artifact of the secular increase in 
aggregate board network is mitigated. In Table 2, we pre-
sent the industry-wise breakdown of the network central-
ity measures. For example, energy and pharmaceuticals 
sectors have the highest degree and the highest level of 
closeness, which means that the EEDs in these industries 
can more easily communicate with other directors in the 
network and that information could be transmitted more 
quickly. They also have the highest Eigenvector centrality: 
EEDs in these sectors are connected to better-networked 
directors.
There are a few econometric issues with using network 
centrality measures. First, larger firms tend to have better-
networked boards (Larcker et al. 2013). We purge the firm 
size effects by regressing the four centrality measures on 
the log of firm size and the square of the log of firm size 
and using the residuals as size-adjusted centrality measures. 
Furthermore, if board centrality in the network is positively 
correlated with director quality, then our empirical test 
will simply capture the effect of better quality directors on 
GHG emissions. Ideally, an exogenous shock is required to 
establish the effect of board network on GHG emissions. 
However, an exogenous shock to board network that doesn’t 
otherwise affect GHG emissions is not immediately obvious. 
We will discuss later our approach to address this concern.
Control Variables
Following previous works on corporate environmental per-
formance, we use a range of firm and industry-level observa-
bles in our baseline estimates to control for confounding 
factors (de Villiers et al. 2011; Rao and Tilt 2016).
First, to ensure that our results are not driven by the effect 
of independent directors, we control for the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board (% Non-
Executive Directors). Additionally, we control for a range 
of board governance variables. This includes the number of 
directors (Board Size), CEO duality whether the CEO is also 
the Chairman (CEO Duality), an indicator for the presence 
of a legal expert on the board (Law Expert), and the aver-
age number of years the firm’s directors have served on the 
board ( Board Tenure). We also control for the institutional 
shareholding of firms (%Shareholding-Institutions) because 
institutional ownership is shown to be associated with better 
environmental performance (Johnson and Greening 1999).
Second, we control for firm characteristics that can affect 
environmental performance. We use firm age as a proxy for 
the technology that a firm has access to (Firm Age). We 
control for the standard set of financial measures like prof-
itability (ROA), firm size (Ln Sales), and risk in the oper-
ating environment (Volatility). Following de Villiers et al. 
Table 3  Network summary 
statistics 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
No. of firms 353 353 354 356 353 352 354 354
No. of directors 1254 1372 1029 1003 950 1026 885 961
No. of connections 458 503 524 528 616 562 663 624
Mean degree 4.224 4.107 4.403 4.507 4.632 4.600 4.141 4.244
Mean closeness 0.277 0.280 0.254 0.269 0.275 0.281 0.234 0.267
Mean betweenness 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.025
Mean Eigen vector 0.054 0.057 0.050 0.059 0.066 0.051 0.048 0.053
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(2011), we also control for financial slack measured as cash 
or cash equivalents over total assets (Slack). To control for 
the capital structure of the firm, we use total debt over total 
equity as our measure of leverage (Leverage). Environmental 
performance may be affected by the investment opportunity 
set of a firm. For this reason, we control for market-to-book 
value (MTBV).
Finally, because the environmental performance of a firm 
may be related to the industry it operates in, we control for 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as a measure of industry 
competitiveness (HHI). The correlation matrix of the key 
variables is presented in Table 4.
In “Appendix 5”, we also present univariate differences 
for all observable firm characteristics for firms with and 
without EEDs. The results show that firms with EEDs have 
larger boards, lower degree, and lower GHG emissions. 
However, there are no statistically significant differences in 
any other aspects. This partially mitigates our concerns that 
appointments of EEDs are non-random.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we examine how environmental performance 
of firms is affected by director skills and network connec-
tions. We first present the results of a standard panel two-
way fixed effects model. We then check that our findings are 
not driven by endogeneity in environmental performance. 
Finally, we analyze the impact of EEDs on other corporate 
outcomes.
EEDs and Environmental Performance
Our first two hypotheses are that the presence of EEDs on 
a board and their assignment to board environmental com-
mittees affect the environmental performance of firms. We 
present the results in Table 5 with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. We estimate the following regres-
sion equation:
where i denotes the firm and t the year. Variables are defined 
as follows: GHGit is the total GHG emissions of firm i in 
year t (standardized by the threshold levels), 훼i is the firm 
fixed effect, 훿t is the year fixed effect. Vector 퐙it contains 
the various firm, board and industry-level control variables 
discussed in the previous section.
The vector 퐄퐱퐩it−1 contains the variables of interest 
related to environmental expertise for firm i in year t − 1 : 
the binary variable EED dummy, which is equal to one if 
at least one director on the board has some environmental 
experience, the binary variable Environmental Commit-
tee and the interaction term. As denoted by the subscripts, 
(1)GHGit = 훼i + 훿t + 훽T퐄퐱퐩it−1 + 훾T퐙it + 휖it
environmental expertise is measured in the year preceding 
GHG emissions. In establishing an association between 
board characteristics and environmental performance (and 
later for network centrality and environmental performance), 
reverse causal associations whereby an individual director 
with a background in environmental sustainability accepts 
positions in firms with better performance need close atten-
tion. We try to mitigate this concern in the following ways. 
First, we lag the independent variables by one year. This 
identifies board characteristics that predate emissions by at 
least one year. Second, our baseline estimates include year 
and firm fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control for time-
invariant unobservable firm characteristics that might simul-
taneously impact upon GHG emissions and the appointment 
of directors with environmental expertise. Year fixed effects 
capture the influence of aggregate trends.
In column 1, we show that the presence of at least one 
director with environmental experience on the board is asso-
ciated with lower GHG emissions. In column 2, we add the 
indicator for the presence of an environmental committee 
on the board. In this specification, we are trying to isolate 
the effect of director expertise from the firm’s intrinsic focus 
on environmental issues. Both director expertise and the 
presence of an environmental committee seem to be nega-
tively associated with GHG emissions. The effect of board 
expertise on GHG emissions persists after controlling for 
the importance of environmental performance to the firm. In 
column 3, we add an interaction of board expertise in envi-
ronmental issues and the presence of an environmental com-
mittee. This captures the effect of appointing a director with 
environmental expertise on environmental committees and 
allows us to test our Hypothesis 2. In addition to environ-
mental committees and environmental expertise, the interac-
tion term is also negatively associated with GHG emissions. 
Finally, as shown in columns 4 and 5, the economic and 
statistical significances of our results are not affected by the 
use of alternate measures of environmental experience of the 
board (i.e., number of EEDs, and  Average tenure of EEDs).4
In gist, these estimates suggest that our first two hypoth-
eses are supported. These results provide evidence that 
the board of directors represents the concerns of wider 
stakeholders of the firm, over and above their fiduciary 
responsibility of shareholder value maximization. Appoint-
ing EEDs on boards, and subsequently assigning them to 
4 As a measure of robustness, we examine the effect of executive 
directors with environmental expertise (executive EEDs) using a 
dummy variable, Executive- EEDs, defined in a similar way as EED 
Dummy. We find a negative and statistically significant association 
between executive EEDs and GHG emissions (at a level of 5%). How-
ever, the coefficient (− 0.008) is lower than the coefficients for non-
executive EEDs from columns 1–3 of Table. Full results are available 
upon request.
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Table 5  Director experience 
and GHG emissions
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: GHG emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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(0.023)
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Observations 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244
Adjusted-R2 0.247 0.253 0.259 0.242 0.194
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environmental committees, is indicative of substantive envi-
ronmental actions. This is evident in better environmental 
performance in terms of reduced GHG emissions. To quan-
tify, a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of 
EEDs on the board is associated with a decrease in GHG 
emissions by 0.004 standard deviation. This implies that 
over 6 years, i.e., the average tenure of EEDs, the decrease 
in GHG emissions will be roughly 0.024 standard devia-
tions. This is equivalent to a reduction of 56,000 tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent for an average firm. The economic effect of 
EED appointment on GHG emissions is likely to be small 
because GHG emissions trade-off environmental sustainabil-
ity and productive capacity. Moreover, due to the long-term 
nature of some environmental investments, the reduction in 
GHG emissions will probably be realized over a longer time 
period.
In addition to specific skills related to environmental 
sustainability, EEDs can facilitate the exchange of informa-
tion on environmental technologies across different firms 
(Hypothesis 3). We investigate the effect of network con-
nections of EEDs on GHG emissions by estimating Eq. (1) 
augmented with a measure of network centrality:
where the variable Networkit−1 is one of the four centrality 
measures previously defined for firm i in year t − 1 : degree, 
closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. As explained 
before, we use size-adjusted centrality measures in all our 
specifications and lag the independent variables by one 
year.5 We present the results in Table 6 with robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. In all the specifications, we 
also control for the presence of EEDs (using EED dummy). 
We find that controlling for specific environmental skills of 
directors, the network centrality of these directors has addi-
tional explanatory power for GHG emissions. All measures 
of centrality are negatively associated with GHG emissions, 
and such associations are statistically significant, except for 
the Degree. This is consistent with the resource depend-
ence theory and tends to support our third hypothesis. The 
argument of value-destroying practices propagated through 
director networks does not seem to hold here. Director net-
works seem to improve a firm’s ethical practices.
The degree is the number of other directors an EED is 
connected with (or the number of information channels), 
while the other centrality measures are different proxies of 
the quality of these information channels. Our findings sug-
gest that the quality rather than the number of connections 
(2)
GHGit = 훼i + 훿t + 훽1퐄퐱퐩it−1 + 훽2Networkit−1 + 훾
T퐙it + 휖it
between EEDs matters for environmental performance. An 
increase in the level of closeness implies that an EED will 
need fewer intermediaries to reach all the other boards in the 
network and so it will have a quicker access to the informa-
tion available in other firms. An increase in the betweenness 
means that an EED will more often stand between pairs of 
boards in the network and will have a greater control over the 
information passing between these pairs. An increase in the 
eigenvector centrality measures implies that an EED is con-
nected to more important boards with potentially many con-
nections and more information channels. Like with appoint-
ments of EEDs, even though it is economically significant, 
the real effect of EED networks on GHG emissions is likely 
to be small. To quantify, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the network centrality of EEDs on the board (measured by 
closeness) is associated with a decrease in GHG emissions 
by 0.233 × 10−4 standard deviation. This implies that over 
6 years, i.e., the average tenure of EEDs, the decrease in 
GHG emissions will be roughly 0.00014 of a standard devia-
tion. This is equivalent to a reduction of 39 tonnes of CO2 
equivalent. Again, it is very likely that given the statistical 
significance of our estimates, these GHG reductions will be 
realized over a longer time period.
Results from Tables 5 and 6 shed light on how some 
governance mechanisms can affect a firm’s ethical behav-
ior. We show that director expertise and network help the 
firm implement substantive ethical practices that improve 
its environmental performance (in terms of GHG emis-
sions). Our findings also suggest that the advisory role of 
directors through information provision is a key element in 
a firm’s ethical behavior. From Tables 5 and 6, the two chan-
nels of information agglomeration seem to matter for firms’ 
environmental performance. First, specific skills of direc-
tors in environmental sustainability facilitate their advisory 
capacity and seem to improve environmental performance, 
especially if these EEDs are also sitting on board environ-
mental committees (Hypotheses 1 and 2). At the same time, 
these directors’ better access to information regarding good 
environmental practices through board networks also posi-
tively influences environmental performance (Hypothesis 3). 
These results indicate that, notwithstanding the potential for 
collusion, the professional network of directors helps in the 
propagation of ethical and sustainable practices.
Endogenous EED Appointment and Network 
Formation
There are a few remaining econometric concerns. First, 
appointments of EEDs can be driven by time-varying unob-
servable characteristics or shocks. For example, it could be 
possible that appointment of directors with environmental 
expertise happens around other major changes in the firms. 
Only 13% of CEO turnovers and 7% of M&As coincide 
5 The reason why we dot include all the centrality measures in the 
same regression but add them one at a time is that they are highly 
correlated.
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with the change in firms’ status of having an environmen-
tal director or not. This partially addresses the concern that 
unobserved shocks are changing both GHG emissions and 
the appointment of environmental directors. Second, the 
presence of EEDs on boards can be sticky at the firm level 
over time. We find in our sample, 77, 72 and 70% of the 
firms that had at least one EED in period t also have them in 
periods t + 1, t + 2, t + 3 respectively. It has been argued that 
Table 6  EED networks and 
GHG emissions
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: GHG emissions
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Observations 3244 3244 3244 3244
Adjusted-R2 0.344 0.379 0.395 0.381
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in cases of time-persistent regressors, instrumental variables 
regressions are preferred over fixed effects models (Angrist 
and Pischke 2008; Dass et al. 2014).
To address these two issues and ensure that the baseline 
results presented above are not driven by endogeneity in 
environmental performance, we estimate an IV-regression 
where we use the supply of EEDs at the industry level as 
an exogenous source of variation in the firm-level appoint-
ment of such directors. Our instrument is Ln(industry sup-
ply of environmental directors per seat). Using a measure 
of industry supply as the exclusion restriction relies on the 
assumption that firms appoint directors with environmental 
expertise from within the same industry to leverage indus-
try-specific knowledge.6 This is based on a few established 
results in corporate finance. First, Knyazeva et al. (2013) 
show that director labor market is highly localized. As indus-
tries tend to be geographically localized, we measure the 
supply of EEDs by identifying and summing all EEDs in 
every 2-digit SIC codes. This relatively broad definition of 
an industry is based on a second result: outside directors 
are more likely to have executive experience in other firms 
at the time of appointment but are less likely to be from a 
firm’s direct competitor (Linck et al. 2008). This industry 
supply is then scaled by the aggregate board size in the same 
industry to implicitly control for industry effects. The theo-
retical underpinning of this approach is that if the supply of 
EEDs in the industry increases, a greater supply of EEDs is 
likely to reduce the search cost for such appointments, but 
it doesn’t directly impact upon GHG emissions at the firm 
level.
We present the 2SLS results in Table 7 for the just iden-
tified models. This is essentially a Heckman-type selection 
model where the dependent variable in the first stage is the 
binary indicator EED. First, we check that the instrument is 
relevant in the first-stage regression, which is presented in 
column 1. The instrument is positively associated with the 
board expertise in environmental affairs, and this associa-
tion is statistically significant. Further, the F-statistics of the 
first-stage regression is greater than 10, thereby mitigating 
concerns about the weak instrument. We present the second 
stage results in columns 2–4 with heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. The parameter estimates of board expertise 
in environmental issues are negative and are statistically sig-
nificant. Our result that environmental expertise matters for 
ethical behavior does not seem to be driven by the potential 
endogenous selection of EEDs to boards.7
Table 7  Controlling for 
endogeneity in director 
experience and GHG
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Dependent variables
EED GHG emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln (Supply per seat) 0.281***
(0.079)














Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes









First stage F-Statistic 12.65
Observations 3244 3244 3244 3244
Adjusted-R2 0.231 0.237 0.240 0.249
7 An alternative empirical strategy would be to look at new director 
appointments and subsequent environmental performance. This can, 
however, be potentially endogenous because firms can appoint EEDs 
precisely because they are trying to respond to environmental con-
cerns.
6 If this assumption is relaxed, and environmental directors are 
appointed from across industry classifications, the instrument will 
lack power in the first-stage estimates.
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Our second concern is related to the endogenous for-
mation of director networks and the correlation between 
financial performance and environmental performance. 
Indeed, if director quality is positively associated with 
the size of her network (Masulis and Mobbs 2011), more 
successful firms (i.e., with better financial performance 
and also better environmental performance if these are 
correlated) may attract better directors, who are also those 
with a larger network. The estimated coefficients of the 
centrality measures will then be biased. In this section, 
Table 8  Controlling for 
endogeneity in board network 
and GHG emissions
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets.
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: GHG emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)







 Eigen vector − 0.009*
(0.005)
 EED dummy − 0.011**
(0.005)
 Environmental Committees − 0.009**
(0.004)
 EED *Environmental Committees − 0.023**
(0.011)
 Firm covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes











 Observations 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404
 Adjusted-R2 0.131 0.166 0.158 0.160 0.164







 Eigen Vector − 0.017**
(0.008)
 EED dummy − 0.017**
(0.005)






 Firm covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes











 Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
 Adjusted-R2 0.137 0.161 0.152 0.165 0.163
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we perform two tests to examine the likelihood that our 
results are driven by such associations between quality 
and network size.
To begin with, we reduce our analysis to a subset of 
firms whose board composition did not change from the 
previous year. This restricts the possibility of assortative 
sorting because the identity (and so the quality) of the 
directors on the board is the same. However, their network 
centrality will vary because they may sit on additional 
boards or through changes in board composition of other 
firms in the network. The results for the sample with this 
restriction are presented in panel A of Table 8. Second, 
we further restrict our sample to firms whose board com-
position as well as first-degree network connections did 
not change from t − 1 to t (the EEDs in this board are sit-
ting on the same number of boards in times t − 1 and t ). 
Any change in the board centrality measures (closeness, 
betweenness, and eigenvector) is likely to be caused only 
by changes in the compositions of other boards. Results 
with these restrictions are presented in panel B of Table 8. 
The results remain economically significant but vary in 
statistical significance due to smaller sample size.
While we cannot establish a causal link, these results also 
provide additional support to our hypothesis that director 
networks affect GHG through EEDs better access to infor-
mation. In panel A, we report the negative association of 
better-networked EEDs with GHG emissions in a sample 
of unchanged board composition. In this sample, any varia-
tion in the centrality of the focal firm is caused by changes 
in the first-degree connections or in the composition of 
other boards. Additional first-degree connections are likely 
to simultaneously introduce better information and better 
monitoring of the EEDs sitting on the focal board: by sit-
ting on a larger number of boards, these directors’ actions 
are exposed to more peers; and this may have a positive 
impact on environmental performance. In panel B, we use 
a further restriction of unchanged first-degree connections. 
This allows us to observe variations in the centrality of the 
focal firm caused only by variations in second-degree con-
nections. Changes in second-degree connections are likely 
to improve the access to information, but may not have a 
direct effect on the monitoring of the focal firm. Indeed, the 
EEDs on the board of the focal firm is the same (unchanged 
board composition) and they are sitting on the same number 
of boards (i.e., they are connected to the same directors), but 
the other boards in the network may be better-connected. An 
increase in the centrality measures of other boards may also 
increase the centrality measures of the EEDs on the focal 
board, which can be interpreted as an increase in the quality 
of their connections, and so a better access to information. 
More broadly, this suggests that governance mechanisms 
enabling a better access to information may improve some 
corporate ethical practices.
EEDs and Other Corporate Policies
In this section, we present a range of placebo tests to ana-
lyze the effect of EEDs on other corporate outcomes. In par-
ticular, we are interested in investigating whether the EEDs 
affect environmental performance through their specific 
skills, or if these environmental skills capture the impact 
of some generic skills, which affect other firm outcomes 
as well. The underlying idea is to examine whether the 
appointment of EEDs reflects the desire of firms to address 
sustainability issues or is it simply a by-product of other 
financial benefits that the EEDs might contribute toward. 
Specifically, we examine the effects of EEDs on CEO pay 
and CEO turnover. This is because non-executive directors 
have been shown to have an impact on the monitoring role 
of the board. We also examine the effect of EEDs and their 
networks on long-term investments.
CEO Pay
To attenuate the concern that our measure of EED captures 
the effect of board independence, we estimate the effect of 
EEDs and EEDs centrality on the log of CEO pay, control-
ling for financial and governance characteristics. Stylized 
results from the corporate governance literature show that 
board structure affects CEO pay (Chhaochharia and Grin-
stein 2009; Boyd 1994). It is not immediately apparent how 
the presence of directors with specific environmental exper-
tise can directly affect CEO compensation. On the other 
hand, if these directors are appointed for generic skills as 
independent directors (and environmental expertise happens 
to be a subset of these generic skills) then better monitor-
ing from the board can lead to lower CEO pay. Network 
connections of EEDs can also affect CEO pay because a 
better-networked board has access to better soft information 
in setting CEO compensation.
The results are reported in Table 9 for EED dummy and 
the four measures of network centrality in columns (1)–(4), 
all including firm fixed effects. The coefficients of the EED 
dummy and the centrality measures are not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels in any of the four specifica-
tions. Therefore, it does not seem that firms with EEDs and 
better-networked EEDs have significantly different levels of 
CEO pay compared to firms without.
CEO Turnover
Board structure and independence have been shown to affect 
CEO turnover (Guo and Masulis 2015; Weisbach 1988). 
Again, to mitigate the concern that our measure of EED 
captures the effect of board independence, we also study 
how the presence of EEDs and their centrality in the EED 
network affect the dismissal of poorly performing CEOs. 
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Using information from BoardEx, we identify all cases of 
CEO turnover where the executive designated as CEO in 
t is different from that in t − 1 . We exclude CEO turnover 
events that are within one year of the merger, acquisition, 
spin-off, and major corporate restructuring. We also exclude 
interim-CEOs and joint-CEOs from our analysis. Finally, if 
the age of the CEO is less than 60 years at the time of turno-
ver, and if she/he does not appear as a CEO/Chairman in a 
comparable firm within 2 years,8 we classify these events 
as forced turnovers. In panel B of Table 9, we present the 
probit results for CEO turnovers.9 There does not seem to 
exist a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of 
Table 9  EEDs and other corporate outcomes
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Panel A Panel B
CEO pay CEO turnover

































Firm covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.124 0.128 0.126 0.108 0.119 0.116 0.125
Panel C Panel D
R&D Capital expense

































Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244 3244
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.194 0.202 0.196 0.163 0.181 0.190 0.185
8 We consider a role to be comparable if the CEO becomes a CEO/
Chairman of a firm which is in the same size decile as the previous 
firm.
9 The results are qualitatively similar for forced CEO turnover, and 
are available on request.
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CEO turnover for firms with and without EEDs. In addition, 
we find no statistically significant effect of EED centrality 
measures on CEO turnover. Together, these results reinforce 
the resource provision role of the EEDs.
Research and Development and Capital Expenses
Further, we look at the impact of EEDs on research and 
development (R&D) expenditures and capital expenditures. 
Improving environmental performance implies the adoption 
of environmental management practices, which impose costs 
on firms. In the case of GHG emissions, some of these costs 
may involve investments in new equipment using cleaner 
technologies (Clarkson et al. 2008; Fisher-Vanden and Thor-
burn 2011) or investments in renewable energy generation 
(Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. 2012). These expenditures are 
likely to be classified as large capital expenditures or expen-
ditures in research and development of new environmental 
technology.
We do not have consistent data on the dollar value of the 
investment in environmental technology. Instead, we rely on 
the result that the adoption of environmental management 
practices is linked to the level of a firm’s R&D (Anton et al. 
2004) and use total capital expenditures and R&D expendi-
tures, of which environmental sustainability expenses will 
be a subset. If EEDs are appointed for their specific skills or 
network centrality, one channel through which they could 
affect environmental performance is through R&D and capi-
tal expenditures.
In panel C, we present the results with natural log of R&D 
expenses as our dependent variable. Firms with EEDs and 
firms with better-networked EEDs have, on average, higher 
investments in research and development, and this positive 
association is statistically significant in all the four specifica-
tions. In panel D, we present the results with the natural log 
of capital expenditure as our dependent variable. Again, the 
presence of EEDs and their network centrality are positively 
associated with capital expenditures.
These results suggest that better-networked EEDs act as 
conduits of information and innovation, which is consistent 
with our baseline hypotheses. This might be one potential 
channel through which EEDs affect GHG emissions.
Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we present extensions of our main results. 
We also present the robustness of our findings to alternate 
explanations and potential misclassifications.
Does the Market Value EEDs?
So far, we have examined how EEDs add value to the firm. 
In an interesting extension, we investigate if the market 
values the environmental expertise of directors. Using 
data on the date of announcement of director appointments 
from BoardEx, we conduct an event study to examine how 
investors react to EED appointments, controlling for firm-
specific heterogeneity. We use announcement date of direc-
tor appointments from FTSE 350 firms within our sample 
period. Appointments are excluded if the announcement 
date is not available, or overlaps with other major corporate 
announcements. This yields a sample of 173 EED appoint-
ments, and 179 other director appointments.
We calculate the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) around the announcement date for 3-day and 
7-day windows, and regress the CARs on the EED dummy, 
with firm and industry controls. In Table 10, there is a small 
but statistically significant announcement effect for EED 
appointments to boards for both 3-day and 7-day windows.10 
It seems that the appointments of directors with environmen-
tal expertise are met with investor approval.
Technical Expertise
By our classification of environmental experience, we may 
be employing an imperfect proxy of technical expertise. In 
other words, EEDs could potentially be a subset of direc-
tors with technical expertise. If so, we should get a stronger 
effect by using a measure of technical expertise. From infor-
mation on their education and career background, we con-
struct a measure of technical directors where directors have 
financial, engineering, legal, and technology expertise, in 
Table 10  EED announcement returns
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are
in brackets. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01






Control variables Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Observations 173 173
Adjusted-R2 0.187 0.179
10 We use information from the Announcement Date field of Boar-
dEx and check for the robustness of our results using Effective Date. 
The results are similar in magnitude and significance.
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addition to environmental expertise. Using this measure of 
board expertise, we re-estimate our baseline specifications. 
The coefficient associated with this measure of technical 
expertise is negative but not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels. Therefore, it does not seem that our base-
line results are capturing the effect of technical expertise. 
Directors with specific expertise in environmental issues 
seem to have an effect on GHG emissions. The results are 
presented in column 1 of “Appendix 6”.
Impact of CEO EEDs
Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) show that firms 
can benefit from appointing directors who are CEOs of other 
firms. We identify the subsample of those firm-years where 
there is at least one independent non-executive director who 
is a CEO of another listed firm, denoted as CEO EEDs. A 
large proportion of EEDs, (78%) not CEOs of other firms 
(non-CEO EEDs). We re-estimate our baseline specifica-
tions discussed in the first part of the Empirical Analysis 
section with these indicators for CEO and non-CEO environ-
mental experience. We find that the presence of both CEO 
EEDs and non-CEO EEDs is associated with lower GHG 
emissions. The results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of 
“Appendix 6”.
Alternate Measures of Environmental Performance
While GHG emission is the most pressing of environmental 
concern, other measures of environmental performance need 
to be considered. In alternate specifications, we test for the 
robustness of our results using emissions of other gases like 
sulfur and nitrogen oxides, ammonia, chlorofluorocarbons, 
etc., and hazardous and non-hazardous effluent release as 
measures of environmental performance.11 The results (pre-
sented in “Appendix 7”) are consistent with our baseline 
estimates, albeit with smaller sample sizes.
Conclusion
One of the major concerns of our times is to integrate eco-
nomic and environmental well-being and there is institu-
tional pressure on firms to be environmentally responsible 
is increasingly enforced. Firms may adopt either symbolic 
or substantive measures to improve the ethical and sustain-
able business practices. It is likely that the board of directors 
will be responsible to implement and monitor such practices. 
Therefore, the role of the board of directors in catering to 
the interests of the wider stakeholders of the firm, over and 
above the traditional role of shareholder value maximiza-
tion, is attracting the attention of academics and regulatory 
authorities. In this paper, we provide some insight into the 
resource provision role of the board of directors in firms’ 
adoption of substantive environmental measures, i.e., the 
reduction in GHG emission. Explicitly, we focus on two 
possible channels. First, EEDs may have skills or expertise 
that suit them to provide information and strategic advice 
on ensuring substantive ethical practices. Second, EEDs can 
leverage knowledge on environmental strategies through 
shared directorships. For example, better-networked EEDs 
can improve a firm’s ability to respond to shocks in envi-
ronmental technology or anticipate regulatory changes on 
sustainability and consequently improve this firm’s ethical 
practices.
Controlling for endogeneity concerns, we find that EEDs 
have an economically significant impact on GHG emissions: 
firms with board expertise in environmental sustainability 
have lower GHG emissions. We test for alternative expla-
nations, and our results suggest that the effect of EEDs is 
likely to be a specific expertise effect rather than due to some 
general or technical skills. We also find that EEDs leverage 
their network connections on environmental issues. Finally, 
the appointment of directors with environmental expertise is 
received positively by the market. The paper also identifies 
investments in green technology as a potential mechanism 
through which directors can influence a firm’s sustainable 
practices. In gist, our results show that the market values the 
environmental expertise of directors and that these directors, 
through their advisory role, positively affect the adoption 
of substantive corporate ethical practices, e.g., investing in 
green technologies. In that respect, our results lend support 
to the debate on the role of the directors in catering to the 
interests of wider stakeholders of the firm.
In the light of the above findings, an obvious question 
arises: can corporate ethical and sustainable practices be 
ensured by appointment of EEDs? It is not the case for a 
number of reasons. First, the appointment of directors with 
a set of specific skills has opportunity costs. Appointing a 
director with environmental skills might mean keeping out 
a director with general or other specific skills, which might 
be valuable to the firm. Second, if the environmental tech-
nology is industry-specific then anti-trust laws may prohibit 
firms competing in the same product market to have shared 
directors. This constrains the supply of environmental direc-
tors to firms. Such appointments are likely to be endogenous 
selections where the benefits of such appointments outweigh 
the cost. Like voluntary compliance with environmental 
standards, director expertise and connectedness may not lead 
to better environmental performance for all firms.
Finally, corporate ethics and sustainability is a multidi-
mensional issue, and cannot be wholly captured through 
11 We use information on both hazardous and non-hazardous effluent 
releases to land and water.
288 S. Homroy, A. Slechten 
1 3
reductionist measures of environmental pollution. The ethi-
cal and sustainability concerns of non-emitting industries 
can be different and our results will not be generalizable 
in that context. Our results, therefore, do not discount the 
importance of regulations on corporate ethical and sustain-
ability practices.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: Variables Summary and Data 
Description
Key variables Source Description
Firm characteristics
GHG emissions E-PRTR/own calcu-
lation
Emission of green 
house gases normal-
ized by permissible 
threshold
Other Gases E-PRTR/own calcu-
lation
Emission of other gases 
like ammonia, hydro-
gen sulfides, CFCs, 
NOx SOx etc.












Market value of equity/
book value of equity
Firm Age Thompson one Date company founded
Sales Datastream/World-
scope




Debt to equity ratio
Volatility Datastream/World-
scope
Volatility in annual 
stock price
Slack Author’s calculation Cash or cash equiva-
lents/Total Assets
HHI Author’s calculation Sum of squared market 




Expenses in research 
and development of 
goods and




Capital expenditure as 
percentage of total 
assets
Key variables Source Description
Board characteristics




BoardEx Fraction of independent 
directors
Board Tenure Authors’ calculation Average tenure of all 




BoardEx Proportion of shares 




BoardEx Binary indicator for 
board environmental 
committees
CEO duality BoardEx CEO is also the Chair-
man
Law experts BoardEx Directors with a legal 
qualification




CEO turnover Authors’ calculation Indicator for change 
in the CEO of a firm 
between two years.
EEDs BoardEx and public 
sources
Indicator that a direc-




Degree BoardEx The number of a node’s 
connections (see 
“Appendix 4”)
Closeness BoardEx The ease to reach the 
other nodes in the 
network (see “Appen-
dix 4”)
Betweenness BoardEx Sum of proportions for 
all pairs of nodes j 
and k in which node 
i is on
the shortest path 
between j and k , 
normalized by the 
maximum possible 
betweenness for the 
network (see “Appen-
dix 4”)
Eigen vector BoardEx A node’s eigenvector 
is proportional to the 
sum of eigenvector 
values of all nodes 
directly connected to 
it (see “Appendix 4”)
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Appendix 2: GHG Emissions Algorithm
As a measure of firms’ environmental performance, we 
use firms’ GHG emission data from the E-PRTR (Website: 
http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/). The E-PRTR is the Europe-wide 
register that provides annual data on the amounts of pollut-
ant releases to air, water, and land from 93 key pollutants 
(e.g., heavy metals, pesticides, greenhouse gases, and diox-
ins) as well as off-site transfers of waste and of pollutants 
in waste water from 43,464 industrial facilities in the EU 
Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Serbia, and 
Switzerland over the period 2007–2014. The main advantage 
of the register is that data are comparable across countries 
and pollutants because data collection and reporting are 
standardized over all pollutants in all countries. A facility is 
defined as an operation unit of a firm focused on a narrowly 
defined process like packaging, bottling, etc.
Our original dataset downloaded from the E-PRTR web-
site contains 561,075 observations. Each line of the dataset 
reports data on one particular pollutant released/transferred 
by one facility in one year as well as information about the 
category of the pollutant (greenhouse gas, pesticide, etc.) 
and information about the facility (e.g., address, activity sec-
tor, parent company, etc.). As a consequence, we may have 
several observations for the same facility within a year if this 
facility releases or transfers various types of pollutants per 
year. For example, the facility with ID = 9 (Saint-Gobain 
Glass Polska Sp. Z o. o.) has three lines for the year 2011 in 
the dataset because this facility released two types of pol-
lutant (NOx and Cadmium) and reported hazardous waste 
disposal in 2011.
As we are not interested in one particular pollutant, we 
aggregate pollutants in 7 categories defined on the E-PRTR 
website: Chlorinated organic substances, greenhouse gases 
(our variable of interest), heavy metals, inorganic sub-
stances, other gases, other organic substances, pesticides. 
We have also two categories for waste: hazardous and non-
hazardous. Since the harmfulness of each pollutant differs 
and also the relative amount of each pollutant emitted dif-
fers, we cannot simply add the individual amounts of each 
pollutant to aggregate them in these 7 categories.
Each pollutant is reported in the E-PRTR if the emit-
ted amount exceeds a reporting threshold. The reporting 
thresholds are set up by the European Commission based 
on their impact on human health and on the environment.12 
We therefore normalize the emitted amount according to the 
reporting threshold and then sum these normalized amounts 
of pollutant belonging to the same category for each indi-
vidual facility.
We finally reshape the dataset to have only one observa-
tion per facility per year. Our dataset has now 208,735 lines. 
Each line contains information on the facility (address, par-
ent company, and economic activity code) and the amount 
of pollutant by category. From this dataset, we extract all the 
facilities belonging to UK firms featured in the FTSE350 
and aggregate pollution data at the firm level as explained 
in the Data Section of our paper.
Appendix 3: Board Expertise Algorithm
To identify directors with environmental expertise, we use 
data from BoardEx on the education and past expertise of 
directors in matters related to environmental sustainability. 
We classify directors as having prior experience in environ-
mental issues if they have served on any of the following 
board-level committees in a previous role:
 1. Health, Safety, Security, and Environment
 2. Safety and Sustainable Development
 3. Sustainability and Stakeholder Management
 4. Corporate Responsibility
 5. Sustainability
 6. Safety, Ethics, and Environmental Assurance
 7. Corporate Social Responsibility
 8. Sustainable and Responsible Business
 9. Health, Safety, Environment and Community
 10. Ethics-Compliance-Corporate Responsibility
 11. Safety, Health, and Environment
 12. Sustainable Development
 13. Risk and CSR
 14. Environment, Health and Safety
 15. CSR and Regulatory Issues
 16. Corporate Compliance and Responsibility
In order to test for the robustness of our results, we also 
construct different measures by random sampling of these 
keywords. Data on EEDs are available from the authors’ 
websites on request.
Appendix 4: EEDs Centrality Measures
The concept of centrality is multidimensional. In this paper, 
we focus on the four commonly used measures of centrality 
(see Jackson 2010; Larcker et al. 2013): Degree, Eigenvec-
tor, Closeness and Betweenness. We compute these meas-
ures for each EED in the network formed by shared direc-
torship. To aggregate these measures at the board level, we 
compute the average centrality measures of the EEDs on the 
12 See Article 5 of the E-PRTR Regulation No 166/2006 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 concerning 
the establishment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer Reg-
ister and amending Council Directives 91/689/EEC and 96/61/EC.
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board. We discuss the relevance of each of these measures 
below:
1. Degree
The simplest centrality measure is the count of the number 
of connections. A higher degree reflects more pathways to 
access to information, and expertise. The degree centrality 
varies over time due to entry and exit of directors, and is 
normalized by n − 1 , where n is the number of directors 
in the network.
dij is equal to 1 if directors i and j sit on the same board and 
0 otherwise.
2. Eigenvector
It can be argued that a director is more influential when 
his individual connections are also well-networked. Unlike 
degree, which weights every link equally, the eigenvec-
tor weights links according to their eigenvector values. 
A nodes’ eigenvector is proportional to the sum of the 
eigenvector values of all nodes directly connected to it. 
It is useful in determining who is connected to the most 
connected nodes. The eigenvector of a node is defined as
where 휆 is the eigenvalue. In our context, it is important 
to measure how central a director is in terms of its own 
degree but it also important to take into account the degrees 
of the directors he is connected to. If director i is connected 
to director j, who is very well connected (i.e., has a high 
degree), then director i has a greater opportunity to get 
access to information or influence the rest of network.
3. Closeness
This measures the ease to reach other nodes or how long 
it will take to spread information from one director to all 
other directors sequentially.
where lij is the distance between directors i and j. In our net-
work, a high closeness indicates a director who is close to 














with them without going through many intermediaries. High 
closeness makes information transmission quicker.
4. Betweenness
The betweenness of a node is a measure of its role as an 
intermediary. Formally, node i betweenness is the sum of 
proportions for all pairs of nodes j and k in which node i 
is on the shortest path between j and k. It is normalized by 
the maximum possible betweenness for the network with 
n nodes. Mathematically, It is defined as
where P(j, k) is the number of shortest paths between j and 
k and Pi(j, k) is the number of shortest paths between j and 
k that goes through i. Directors with high betweenness are 
on the path of a large number of information flows and as 
such, able to influence a large number of directors as well as 
be able to collect information quickly from many sources.
Appendix 5: Univariate Comparison of Firms 
with and without EEDs
Means Difference
Firms with EEDs Firms 
without 
EEDs
ROA 7.214 7.988 − 0.784
MTBV 1.512 1.498 0.014
Ln sales 17.248 17.507 − 0.259
Leverage 0.575 0.560 0.015
Volatility 0.034 0.040 − 0.006
Slack 0.226 0.221 0.005
GHG emissions (nor-
malized)
10.409 14.751 − 4.432***
R&D 0.049 0.047 0.002
Capital expenditure 0.603 0.586 0.017
Firm Age 2.898 3.137 0.239




Board Size 8.648 7.501 1.147**
% Non-executive direc-
tors
55.013 55.304 − 0.291
CEO Duality 0.228 0.235 − 0.007
Law Expert 1.07 1.24 − 0.17





(n − 1)(n − 2)∕2
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Means Difference
Firms with EEDs Firms 
without 
EEDs
Degree 7.225 8.543 − 1.318**
Closeness 0.288 0.285 0.003
Betweenness 0.015 0.011 0.004
Eigen Vector 0.049 0.039 0.010
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 (2-tailed)
Appendix 6: Robustness of EED 
Classifications
Dependent variable: GHG emissions
(1) (2) (3)
Technical directors − 0.007
(0.010)
CEO EEDs − 0.011**
(0.005)
Non-CEO EEDs − 0.021**
(0.009)
Firm covariates Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes







Observations 3244 3244 3244
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.189 0.264
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Appendix 7: EEDs and Other Measures 
of Pollution
Dependent variables
Other gases Effluent release
(1) (2)




Firm covariates Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Dependent variables
Other gases Effluent release
(1) (2)






Adjusted R2 0.180 0.163
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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